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BILLS AND NOTES
PAUL J. HARTMAN*
The Parol Evidence Rule as Applied to Bills and Notes. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court case of Lazarov v. Klyce' presented the problem
of when an agent who has signed a negotiable instrument can use parol
evidence to exonerate himself from personal liability on the instrument
at the suit of the payee. The payee of a note sued the defendant, Arnold
Klyce, to hold him individually liable on the note of a corporation of
which defendant was an officer. The defense was that the note was an
obligation of the corporation, that defendant signed as an officer of the
corporation and that he incurred no personal liability on the instru-
ment. The signatory part of the note was as follows:
"Independent Tool & Machine Co.
"By J. W. Clements
"Arnold Klyce"
Over the objection that defendant's oral proof showing his representa-
tive capacity violated the parol evidence rule, defendant was permitted
to prove that he signed only as an agent; and the jury found a verdict
for defendant. The chancellor set the verdict aside on the ground that
the note was clear and unambiguous and that, therefore, parol evidence
was improperly admitted. The Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that there was ambiguity surrounding the manner in which
defendant's signature appeared on the note and that parol evidence
was properly admitted to clear up the ambiguity. The Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the decree of the
chancellor.
The crucial question was whether the signature of Arnold Klyce on
the note was ambiguous so that parol evidence was admissible to show
that he signed as an agent of the corporation and that he intended not
to bind himself personally. A well-recognized authority states the ma-
jority rule under the Negotiable Instruments Act, adopted in all
forty-eight states, to be that, although an agent nowhere on the instru-
ment discloses the fact that he is acting in a representative capacity,
nevertheless he can use parol evidence in an effort to escape personal
liability, if the instrument discloses the name of some third party who
might or might not be his principal.2 It is rather clear that this rule
Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 255 S.W.2d 11 (Tenn. 1953). See the comment on this case in the Inter-
pretation Section of the Contracts article and the Evidence section of the Pro-
cedure and Evidence article.
2. BRrrTON, BI.Ls AND NoTEs 782-88 (1943). There are numerous cases sup-
porting this view.
Across the left hand end of a check was printed: "State Street Grocery Co.,
Inc., 161 State St., Hartford, Conn." It was signed: "M. Gross." The payee
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would have permitted the defendant in the case at hand to introduce
parol evidence to show that he did not bind himself personally. The
Court of Appeals so held, but the Supreme Court, in refusing to admit
the parol evidence, followed a strict, minority view of personal lia-
bility of an authorized agent who, in some form on the instrument, has
disclosed his principal's name and has given some intimation of the fact
of his agency. This view holds that the agent cannot be exonerated
from personal liability by use of parol evidence, even though there is
disclosed somewhere on the instrument the name of another person
who might or might not be the principal.
3
The factor that causes difficulty in the instant type of case is the
doubt as to whether the signer intended to sign as an agent or as a
surety for his principal. Under the majority view, such doubts are re-
solved in favor of the signer. Having due regard for the varied, if not
careless, forms adopted by persons who really intend to bind their
principals and not themselves, a leading authority in the field thinks
the majority rule preferable to the strict minority, for normally the
majority's construction effectuates the intention of both parties.4 Also,
the minority rule often gives the holder a more favorable position than
sued Gross as drawer of the check to hold him personally liable. It was held
that parol evidence was admissible to show that Gross signed only as an agent
of the State Street Grocery, even though he had not added words to indicate
any representative capacity, and judgment for plaintiff against Gross individ-
ually was reversed. Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Gross, 98 Conn. 782, 120 Atl. 596
(1923).
A note was signed:
"Carlton Auto Supplies Co., Inc.
"Sam Lichtenstein,
"Wm. Lee, Treas."
It was held error to direct a verdict against Lichtenstein personally. Parol evi-
dence tending to show that he signed as president of the corporation was
wrongfully excluded by the trial court. Hoffstaedter v. Lichtenstein, 203 App.
Div. 494, 196 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dep't 1922).
A note was signed:
"Northway Trailer Car Company,
"Kate Gleason."
It was reversible error to direct a verdict for plaintiff, payee, against Gleason
personally. The trial court should have permitted Gleason to show that she
signed only as treasurer of the corporation. Central Bank of Rochester V.
Gleason, 206 App. Div. 28, 200 N.Y. Supp. 384 (4th Dep't 1923).
For additional cases permitting the agent to use parol evidence to show that
he signed in a representative capacity, and not to bind himself personally,
where the instrument disclosed the name of a third party who could have been
the principal, although nowhere on the instrument was it disclosed that the
agent did sign in a representative capacity, see Fricke v. Belz, 237 Mo. App.
861, 177 S.W.2d 702 (1944); Germania National Bank v. Mariner, 129 Wis. 544,
109 N.W. 574 (1906). See also 1 MECHEM, AGENCY § 1162 (2d ed. 1914); MECHEM,
OuTLmEs OF AGENCY § 316 (4th ed. 1952).
3. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 788-93 (1943). One of the cases relied on by
the Tennessee Court as directly in point is the Virginia case of Coal River Col-
lieries v. Eureka Coal & Wood Co., 144 Va. 263, 132 S.E. 337 (1926). But in the
later Virginia case of Baach v. Bank of Pocahontas, 157 Va. 274, 160 S.E. 68
(1931), the court may have sapped somewhat the vitality of the Eureka Coal
case.
4. BoTTON, BILLs AND NoTEs 791 (1943).
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he deserves. If affairs have gone badly with the principal, the minority
approach may enable the payee to collect from the agent, although the
payee would never have thought of it at the time the agent signed the
instrument.
When the plaintiff is a holder in due course, perhaps parol testimony
should be more narrowly restricted to the clearing up of ambiguities
than when he is the payee. The Lazarov case involved a suit by the
payee, however, and not an action by a holder in due course.
Power of Court to Reduce Attorney's Fee Stipulated in Bills and
Notes. The Tennessee Court of Appeals case of Young v. Jones5 in-
volved, among other things, the question whether the court can control
the amount that the holder of a note can collect as an attorney's fee
from the maker of the note, where the note expressly stipulates that
the maker will pay a fixed percentage by way of an attorney's fee. The
note in question contained the customary promise to pay a ten percent
attorney's fee. The trial court denied the holder recovery of the fee
called for in the note, but the Court of Appeals reversed and awarded
the holder the full ten percent. Although it is not clear, the opinion
suggested that the maker had taken the position, among others, that
the full ten percent should not be allowed and that the court should
determine what was a reasonable attorney's fee. Rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court of Appeals held that the promise to pay ten percent
was a "constituent part of the obligation of the note contract and the
court has no power to change the contract."6 The Court then purported
to distinguish the Tennessee Supreme Court case of Holston National
Bank v. Wood 7 on the ground that the Wood note called for a "reason-
able attorney's fee," in "which event the matter is left to the court to
determine what is a reasonable fee."8
The result reached by the Court of Appeals on this point may be
right under the circumstances, but the opinion calls for unfavorable
comment in two respects. In the first place, the note in the Wood case
did not stipulate for a "reasonable attorney's fee." It expressly pro-
vided that a ten percent attorney's fee would be paid. In the second
place, the Wood case very clearly took the position that "[w]hile a
stipulation in a note for an attorney's fee is valid and will be enforced
by this court, the court is not bound by a provision to the effect that
any particular amount shall be allowed for such fees, and no matter
what stipulation as to the amount is made in the face of the note, it
will not be enforced unless it appears reasonable to the court."9 In
fact, the Wood Court awarded the holder less than the specified ten
percent.
5. 255 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. 1952).
6. Id. at 706.
7. 125 Tenn. 6, 140 S.W. 31 (1911).
8. 255 S.W.2d at 706.
9. 125 Tenn. at 16, 140 S.W. at 34.
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The Wood case is in line with the almost universal view that the
amount of attorney's fees fixed by the parties in bills and notes is not
conclusive and that the amount recoverable is within the control of
the court.10 By the same token, the view expressed by the Court of
Appeals in the principal case to the effect that the court has "no
power" to change the amount of the fee where a definite amount is
stipulated not only is out of line with the view of .the Supreme Court
in the Wood case, but it also is contrary to the rule adopted in virtually
all jurisdictions." There is good reason why the amount recoverable
should be within the control of the court even where there is a stipula-
tion of a definite fee in the instrument. It would be contrary to sound
public policy to permit the holder of an instrument unjustly to enrich
himself by exacting unreasonable, unconscionable and oppressive
charges or usurious interest under the guise of an attorney's fee stipu-
lated in the instrument.
12
Failure of Consideration as Defense of Maker of Negotiable Note. In
Norbert Trading Co. v. Underwood,'3 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
was concerned with the defendant-maker's defense of failure of con-
sideration for a negotiable note and also with the defense that the note
had not been properly assigned to the plaintiff by the payee. An inci-
dental question involved the authority of the president of the payee
corporation to transfer the note. The defendant-maker had executed
the note to the payee corporation, whose president and secretary had
transferred it to the plaintiff for value simply by indorsing on the note
the name of the payee corporation, the names of the president and sec-
retary in their official capacity and also the names of the president and
secretary in their individual capacities. When the plaintiff sued the
defendant, the latter filed an unsworn plea setting up failure of con-
sideration and that the note was not properly assigned by the payee to
the plaintiff. The only pertinent proof offered by either party was by
the plaintiff to the effect that it purchased the note in question. In
deciding for the plaintiff, the Court held that there arose a presumption
that the plaintiff was a holder in due course and that the defendant
had not rebutted that presumption; the plea denying the assignment
of the note did not shift to the plaintiff the burden of proving title,
10. E.g., Chesterton Bank of Maryland v. Walker, 163 Fed. 510 (4th Cir.
1908); Sewell v. Wilcox, 290 S.W. 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Richardson v.
Breeding, 167 Va. 30, 187 S.E. 454 (1936); see Citizens National Bank v. Waugh,
78 F.2d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 1935); Merchants' Bank of Grenada v. Thomas, 121
Fed. 306, 312 (5th Cir. 1903); see BrTTOr, BILLS AND NOTES 145 (1943).
11. E.g., In re Gebhard, 140 Fed. 571 (M.D. Pa. 1905); Sarasota Publishing
Co. v. E. C. Palmer & Co., 102 Fla. 303, 135 So. 521 (1931); Richardson v. Breed-
ing, 167 Va. 30, 187 S.E. 454 (1936); First National Bank v. Larsen, 60 Wis. 206,
19 N.W. 67 (1884).
12. See Citizens National Bank v. Waugh, 78 F.2d 325, 329, 331 (4th Cir.
1935); Holston National Bank v. Wood, 125 Tenn. 6, 16, 140 S.W. 31, 34 (1911);
Richardson v. Breeding, 167 Va. 30, 187 S.E. 454, 455 (1936).
13. 253 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1952).
1953 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
since there was no evidence of failure of coInsideration and no evidence
to overcome the presumption that the plaintiff was a holder in due
course.
While it is possible to transfer a negotiable instrument by the use of
a qualified indorsement ("'without recourse' or any words of similar
import") so that the transferor's liabilities are only those of a common
law assignor,14 the transfer of a negotiable instrument by a blank, un-
qualified indorsement such as occurred in the case at hand is a ne-
gotiation, and the rights of the parties are governed by the law of
negotiable instruments rather than by the law of assignments.15 To put
a more extreme case than the one on hand, even the use of the lan-
guage of assignment accompanying the signature of the transferor
generally is not enough to constitute a qualified indorsement. 16 The
word "assign" is not taken to be of similar import to the qualified in-
dorsement "without recourse," and, therefore, such transfer is a ne-
gotiation by an unqualified indorsement.1
7
Since the transfer in the present case constituted the negotiation of
a negotiable instrument by an unqualified indorsement, the rights
of the transferee were governed by the universally adopted Negotiable
Instruments Law. That being so, the rights of the plaintiff are clear.
When a plaintiff establishes that he is a holder, there arises a prima
facie presumption that he is a holder in due course.18 Section 52 of the
N.I.L. defines a holder in due course as a holder who has taken the
instrument under the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and with-
out notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was
the fact;
3. That he took-it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of
14. These warranties are found in § 65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
TEN. CODE ANN. § 7389 (Williams 1934). The words which will constitute a
qualified indorsement, limiting the indorser's liabilities to that of an assignor,
are found in § 38 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, TENN. CODE ANi. § 7362
(Williams 1934).
15. See BuRrToN, BILLS AND NoTEs § 58 (1943).
16. Therefore, the transferee from the payee may qualify as a holder in due
course and recover from prior parties free from personal defenses and equities.
Jones County Trust & Savings Bank v. Kurt, 192 Iowa 965, 182 N.W. 409 (1921)
("I do hereby assign," followed by signature of payee, constituted a negotia-
tion and not an assignment. Consequently, the transferree became a holder in
due course, cutting off personal defense of fraud.). To the same effect: Divel-
biss v. Burns, 161 Miss. 724, 138 So. 346 (1931); Fay v. Witte, 262 N.Y. 215,
186 N.E. 678 (1933); cf. Duffy's Adm'r v. O'Connor, 66 Tenn. 498 (1874) (under
common law).
17. See BRITTON, BxL.s AND NoTEs § 58 (1943).




any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the per-
son negotiating it. 19
To establish that he is a holder, a plaintiff must prove that hi is the
payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of- it,,or the
bearer thereof.20 Since the note involved in the instant case was- order
paper, it could be negotiated only by the indorsement of the !payee and
delivery to the plaintiff,2 1 who then became the indorsee in possession.
Plaintiff's position in the present case was not as strong as it might
have been in this connection by reason of the fact that it did not offer
any direct proof that the payee did indorse the note, although plaintiff's
president testified without contradiction that it bought the note. Since
the defendant's pleadings apparently did not properly tender the issue
of the genuineness and adequacy of the indorsement of the payee, it
was not necessary that the plaintiff offer proof concerning the payee's
indorsement. Defendant's plea of non-assignavit (that the note was
not properly assigned to plaintiff) does not appear sufficient to raise
even the issue of assignment, because it was not under oath.2 Since
defendant's pleadings had not put into issue the matter of whether
the plaintiff was a holder in due course, the plaintiff had made out a
prima facie case entitling it to recover by presenting the note with the
indorsement of payee on it and the testimony that the plaintiff had
purchased the note.23 In short, the plaintiff had proved that it was a
holder, which gave rise to the accompanying presumption that it was a
holder in due course, and this entitled the plaintiff to a verdict, since
19. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7376 (Williams 1934).
20. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 191, TENN. CODE ANN. § 7515 (Williams
1934).
21. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 30, TENN. CODE ANN. § 7354 (Williams
1934).
22. See CARUTHERS, HISTORY OF A LAWSUIT § 241 (7th ed., Gilreath, 1951).
23. Klingstein v. Thomas Circle Cafe, 68 App. D.C. 5, 92 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir
1937); McDuffee v. Kelsey, 312 Mass. 458, 45 N.E.2d 258 (1942); Kots v. Sachs,
185 Misc. 224, 57 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. City Ct. 1945); Beck v. Maller,- 131 App.
Div. 243, 115 N.Y. Supp. 596 (2d Dep't 1909); Cox v. Parsons, 165 Va. 575, 183
S.E. 440 (1936); cf. Farmington State Bank v. Delaney, 167 Minn. 394, 209 N.W
311 (1926). See also BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 99 (1943). Plaintiff may get
some help here by § 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 7340 (Williams 1934), which provides that, where an instrument is no longer
in the possession of a party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and in-
tentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is shown. This pro-
vision was applied in helping to make out a prima facie case for a holder in
Nevil v. Bank of Whitehouse, 158 Tenn. 251, 12 S.W.2d 709 (1929). An alle-
gation in the pleading that plaintiff is the "owner and holder" of the note in
question and proffert of the note are sufficient to show, prima facie, that
plaintiff is a holder in due course. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Patterson,
171 Tenn. 667, 106 S.W.2d 218, 107 S.W.2d 513 (1937).
It is not clear from the opinion in the principal case whether -plaintiff took
the note before maturity, which is a requisite of a holder in due course. NE-
GOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 52, TENN. CODE ANN. 7376 (Williams 1934).
However, unless the indorsement shows the contrary, it is presumed that he
took it before maturity. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 45, TENN, CODE'ANN.
§ 7369 (Williams 1934).
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defendant had not proved a defect in the plaintiff's title. The presump-
tion was not repelled merely by pleadings denying the plaintiff's
ownership or the essentials of holding in due course.24 If a mere al-
legation in the pleadings could deprive the holder of the benefit of the
presumption, it would be practically worthless. It is only when a de-
fendant proves a defect in the title to the instrument that there shifts
to a plaintiff the burden of actually proving that he is a holder in due
course. That is to say, it is only when a defendant has established a
defective title by proof of a good defense against the party with whom
defendant dealt that the presumption of due course holding by plaintiff
is destroyed.25
The Negotiable Instruments Law defines defective title as follows:
"The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within
the meaning of this law when he obtained the instrument, or any sig-
nature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful
means, or for an illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in
breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to fraud."26 It
is to be noted that neither want nor failure of consideration - one of
the defenses asserted in the case at hand -is specifically listed as
creating a defective title. While there is a split on the point, perhaps
the numerical weight of authority, including Tennessee, is to the effect
that proof of want or failure of consideration (material breach of con-
tract by the party with whom defendant dealt) does not amount to
proof of "defective title."27 Consequently, under this view, even a de-
fendant's proof of failure of consideration, to say nothing of his mere
plea thereof unsupported by any evidence, does not shift the burden
to plaintiff to show that he is a holder in due course. Under this pre-
vailing view, a defendant must carry the burden of proving that plain-
tiff is not a holder in due course when he defends on failure of con-
sideration. Otherwise, the presumption that plaintiff is a holder in due
24. Gulf States Steel Co. v. Ford, 173 N.C. 195, 91 S.E. 844 (1917); First Na-
tional Bank v. Wallace, 50 N.D. 330, 196 N.W. 303 (1923); Rivers Bros. v.
C.F.T. Co., 124 Ore. 157, 264 Pac. 368 (1928); Dull v. Mitchell, 283 Pa. 88, 128
Atl. 734 (1925). The New York case of Eichinger v. Zimmerlein, 230 App. Div.
708, 243 N.Y. Supp. 155 (2d Dep't 1930), which took a contrary position, seems
wrong. For a criticism of this case, see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
719 (6th ed., Beutel, 1938).
25. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 104 (1943). Section 59 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law provides: "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a
holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who
has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to
prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired the title as holder
in due course." TENN. CODE ANN. § 7383 (Williams 1934).
26. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTs LAW § 55, TENN. CODE ANN. § 7379 (Williams
1934).
27. E.g., Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Patterson, 171 Tenn. 667, 106 S.W.2d
218, 107 S.W.2d 513 (1937); see Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Pam, 232 N.Y.
441, 134 N.E. 525, 528 (1922). See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 104 (1943) for
a collection of cases on both views as well as that authority's statement of
preference for the minority view.
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course is not repelled, and plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.2 Even un-
der the minority view that proof of want or failure of consideration is
proof of defective title, defendant in the instant case did not shift the
burden to the plaintiff, because he offered no such proof. Moreover,
section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law raises a presumption of
consideration in actions on negotiable instruments.29 Defendant of-
fered no proof to rebut that presumption.
The Court gave some consideration to the question whether the presi-
dent of the payee corporation had power to negotiate the note to the
plaintiff. Here, too, the decision is in line with the modern tendency
in its holding that the president had the power, although no by-law or
resolution is shown giving him such power.30 This rule is particularly
applicable to the case at hand, because the corporation had received
and retained the benefits of the transaction.
28. E.g., Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Patterson, 171 Tenn. 667, 106 S.W.2d
218, 107 S.W.2d 513 (1937).
29. It provides: "Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to
have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signa-
ture appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 7348 (Williams 1934).
30. See 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 601 (Perm. ed., Jones, 1931) and cases
cited therein.
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